Pleased to meet you
gfporn
The Austrian demand was, as Clark points out, a whole lot less of an infringement of Serbian sovereignty than the 1999 Rambouillet Agreement, which Henry Kissinger described as ???a provocation, an excuse to start bombing???. It was less of a provocation, to say nothing of a direct assault on Serbian sovereignty, because the core problem ??? irredentism ??? didn???t respect national boundaries and it was unclear what direct role Serbia had in the 28 June plan, even if it was committed to the ideology that motivated it. Furthermore, once Pa??ić and his colleagues focused on the ultimatum they were inclined to avoid a war by acquiescing. It was Russia that urged resistance; it was only on receipt of a telegram revealing that Russia had ordered mobilisation that the tone changed, and even then the response was evasive rather than dismissive. Meanwhile, Poincar??, the French president, had been in St Petersburg, making sure that his allies there kept the German danger clearly in mind. And even after all this, there were further moments of indecision before the gates really closed. On 29 July in response to the famous ???Dear Nicky??? telegram from the kaiser, the tsar could not bring himself to sign the general mobilisation order. Finally, on 30 July, he did. A last small chance at least to contain a war came with Germany???s decision to force an ultimatum on Belgium to allow it passage through its territory instead of just marching in; and with the British debate over whether to get into a war over Belgium whose result was by no means predetermined. But, finally, on 4 August, all of the ???how??? pieces of the puzzle came collectively into place.